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1. Introduction  
 
In this study, we try to perceive in what way the predictions to the year 2030 
contained in recent prospective studies produced in Europe and in the USA are 
applicable to Portugal 1. For that purpose, we also take into account the views expressed 
at various conferences held at Fundação de Serralves under the subject “Global Trends 
2030: Portugal’s Futures” 2. 
The European and American studies identify the contemporary megatrends with the 
most social impact and try to predict how those trends will evolve up to the year 2030. 
One of the megatrends identified in both studies concerns the so-called “diffusion of 
power”, meaning the gradual erosion of the power of States and the assumption of 
power by non-state actors. 
                                                          
1 The studies are the ones produced by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS/ESPAS) 
(Global trends 2030 - Citizens in an interconnected and polycentric world) and by the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) (Global trends 2030 – Alternative Worlds).  
2 Serralves Conferences “Tendências Globais 2030: Os Futuros de Portugal” (Global Trends 2030: 
Portugal’s Futures) took place from September 28, 2015 to February 11, 2016. Coordinated by Álvaro 
Vasconcelos, they aimed at “identifying and discussing global megatrends in the fields of politics, 




These non-state actors include private companies, in particular multinational 
companies, and civil society’s national and transnational emergent networks 3. 
Regarding these networks, and referring to the refugees’ ongoing crisis in Europe, it 
was highlighted at Serralves Conferences how the absence of an articulated response, 
either from the member States or the EU, generated an extraordinary reaction from 
European civil society, not only through demonstrations that put the pressure on 
political agents but also through NGOs that catapulted a wave of solidarity throughout 
Europe (in Portugal, through PAR – Plataforma de Apoio aos Refugiados – Platform for 
Refugee Support) 4. 
But there are also public entities gaining power and assuming an increasing role. At 
an infra-state level we can point out federal States, regions and local authorities (and, 
among the last, the big metropolitan areas) 5. The erosion of State power can be 
perceived as well in the supra-state level, namely as regards international organizations 
and, most notably, as regards the EU itself. 
Strictly connected to the diffusion of States’ power is the empowerment of the 
individual, resulting from the access of an increasing slice of world population to a 
“middle class” status, not only from an economical, but also from a cultural/educational 
point of view, with all that is implied as regards civic and political engagement. 
Thus, due to economic growth, there is a strong tendency in developing countries to 
generate new middle classes with a strong capacity of assertion and demand – a positive 
factor of democratic expansion 6. This fits in the millennial process of progressive and 
then exponential dilation of democracy (both from the demographical and qualitative 
point of view). This process is ongoing since the times of the Greek agora to western 
liberal parliaments resulting from the 1945 post-War – and it continued with the 
successive erosion of peninsular, Eastern Europe, and military South-American 
dictatorships. As marginalized groups – destitute men, women, descendants of former 
slaves and other minorities – started to gain civil and political rights, demo-liberal 
leaderships became more popular and the highest positions stopped being reserved to 
citizens born within the elites and national oligarchies. Therefore, democracy gradually 
                                                          
3 Cf. EUISS/ESPAS – Global trends 2030 - Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World, p. 19. 
4 This was the opinion expressed by António GUTERRES, Serralves Conferences, session of January 25, 
2016, “Estudo do Caso: a tragédia dos refugiados e a resposta internacional” (Case study: The 
international response to the refugees’ tragedy). 
5 Cf. EUISS/ESPAS – Global trends 2030…, p. 19. 
6 Teresa de SOUSA, Serralves Conferences, session of November 30, 2015, “O futuro da democracia e as 
exigências cidadãs?” (The future of democracy and citizens’ demands?). 
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distances itself from aristocracy and becomes increasingly popular and responsive to 
citizens’ demands 7. 
Concurrently, the progress in communication technologies enabled not only an 
increasing and easier access to information to all, but also individual participation in the 
production of information, with its potential repercussions in public space and debate, a 
process where social networks play a catalytic role. Feminine emancipation also 
contributed to this global phenomenon of the empowerment of the individual 8. 
To these “erosive agents of the State power”, we would add the phenomenon of the 
globalization of public goods (or “deterritorialization” of public goods). Be it due to 
economic, and, particularly, industrial development (which created worldwide 
environmental problems), be it as a result of technological development or the 
dismantling of customs and borders (which led to an exponential growth of international 
contacts and relations with positive effects on individual freedom and economic growth 
but also aggravated the contamination effect of regional economic and financial crises – 
or true epidemics), be it as a consequence of other factors (such as the diversification of 
alternative worldviews, a conflict generator), there are more and more “public goods” 
demanding global responses for their guarantee and good performance. The State, when 
considered separately, becomes increasingly impotent in responding to population’s 
solicitations and to exercise its traditional functions: the guarantee of order, the 
administration of justice and above all, the guarantee of social well-being. This 




2. The diffusion of power in Portugal in the year 2030  
 
Although individual empowerment and loss of power to supranational entities also 
contribute to the diffusion of State power, we will focus essentially on the theme of the 
loss of State power to entities within the State’s territory. Regarding that phenomenon, 
the European report indicates three major realities to be considered: private actors, cities 
and networks. 
                                                          
7 Renato Janine RIBEIRO, Serralves Conferences, session of November 30, 2015, “O futuro da democracia 
e as exigências cidadãs?” (The future of democracy and citizens’ demands?). 
8 Cf. EUISS/ESPAS – Global trends 2030…, p. 12 and ff., 27 and ff., and NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
COUNCIL – Global trends 2030 – Alternative Worlds, p. 9 and ff. 
9 Cf. EUISS/ESPAS – Global trends 2030…, p. 19-20, and NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL – Global 
trends 2030…, p. 51 and ff. 
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2.1.  Private actors 
 
As regards private actors, the European report underlines the increasing role of 
public-private partnerships (PPP), multinational companies and private military 
companies10. Concerning Portugal, it seems that only multinational companies may 
assume increasing importance in the year 2030, when compared to the year 2016. 
In fact, as far as PPPs are concerned, their past use in Portugal, especially in the 
road sector, was excessive (as regards the amounts involved) and abusive (as regards the 
goals that guided their use, namely concealing budgetary expenses), which led to their 
political discredit11. Yet, the use of PPPs in other sectors, such as hospitals and 
railways12, seems not to have suffered from the same deficiencies – and so their 
assessment should be moderately positive13. Whatever the sector at stake, though, the 
continuity in time of existing contracts will imply that PPPs continue to play a relevant 
role, even without an increase, in 2030.   
However, we could consider the concept of “PPP” from a wider point of view, as 
one comprising all cases where services granted by the State are assured by private 
entities, by agreement with the State and enjoying State (partial or total) financing. One 
example, starting in the 1990’s, was the conclusion of contracts between the State and 
non-profit private entities that manage kindergartens, which led to a big increase in 
enrolment in pre-school education. Similar contracts (“association contracts”) were 
concluded with private schools, guaranteeing free of charge teaching at primary and 
secondary levels 14. Whether these other examples of partnerships between the State and 
private entities will recede or suffer an expansion is dependent, on the one hand, on the 
ideological debate regarding the role of the State and, on the other hand, on the 
evolution of its financial availabilities.  
As for private military companies, they do not seem to play a relevant role in 
Portugal, and it does not seem that their role will be more important in 2030. It is true 
that among the various relevant roles of the Portuguese Armed Forces 15, besides 
national territory defence and cooperation within NATO (and, less prominently, with 
                                                          
10 Cf. EUISS/ESPAS – Global trends 2030…, p. 131-133. 
11 Cf. JOAQUIM M. SARMENTO – Parcerias Público-Privadas, chapters 3.5 and 4. 
12 Here, we are only referring to the PPPs that were actually implemented. 
13 Cf., in this sense, ENTIDADE REGULADORA DA SAÚDE – Estudo de avaliação das parcerias público-
privadas na saúde, and JOAQUIM M. SARMENTO – Parcerias Público-Privadas, chapters. 3.3 and 3.4. 
14 Cf. CONSELHO NACIONAL DE EDUCAÇÃO – Estado da Educação 2015, p. 43 and ss.  
15 Concerning these roles, cf. GOVERNO DE PORTUGAL – Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional. 
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the Community of Portuguese Language Countries), there is their participation in peace 
maintenance missions sanctioned by the UN or NATO/EU. Only in this last case could 
it be conceivable, though unlikely, that private companies would assume the role of 
replacing the Portuguese Armed Forces. It seems utterly unlikely that these companies 
may come to substitute the Portuguese State regarding the exercise of its main functions 
– the defence of the national territory and the maintenance of internal order and safety. 
As for multinational companies (and, more generally, foreign-owned companies), 
the current political, economic and financial context seems particularly favourable to the 
increase of their importance and relevance in Portugal in the next 15 years. In fact, the 
economic and financial crisis which arose in 2008 and was aggravated by the public 
debt crisis of 2011 had to cause a necessary deleveraging both from the State and the 
Portuguese private agents 16. As a consequence, there was a general sell of assets, which 
were mainly acquired by foreign companies, the only ones with capital available for the 
purpose. The “national champions”, laboriously built in the 1990’s and 2000’s 17, 
proved giants (to a Portuguese dimension) with feet of clay. The “national decision-
making centres”, with lusophone ambitions, moved abroad. 
On the one hand, this change generates obvious problems regarding national 
sovereignty and hampers any autonomous “industrial policy” strategy. Still, as regards 
future disposals to foreign capital, the State may have a role in assuring that companies 
active in Portugal be owned by foreign companies from different countries, in order to 
prevent the concentration of economic power in a single foreign State. It may also seize 
the opportunity to try to increment foreign productive investment. 
On the other hand, it may mean an opportunity to change the relationship – 
frequently incestuous, so far – between political power and economic power 18. Thus, 
the Portuguese State may now focus on monitoring the compliance with legal rules 
(namely competition law) and on regulating the activity of companies with market 
power or whose performance may affect relevant public interests. 
Consequently, the important powers of Independent Regulatory Bodies, be it the 
ones granted by law (regulatory, tax collection, imposition of fines) or the ones resulting 
                                                          
16 In fact, «between 1995 and 2010, the debt level of families, companies and the State rose from 164% to 
338% of the GDP» – cf. Fernando ALEXANDRE, Luís AGUIAR-CONRARIA and Pedro BAÇÃO – Crise e 
Castigo - Os desequilíbrios e o resgate da economia portuguesa, chapter 4.2. 
17 Cf. Fernando ALEXANDRE, Luís AGUIAR-CONRARIA and Pedro BAÇÃO – Crise e Castigo…, chapter 
5.3. 
18 Regarding the Portuguese State’s crony capitalism, cf. Fernando ALEXANDRE, Luís AGUIAR-CONRARIA 
and Pedro BAÇÃO – Crise e Castigo…, chapter 5.3. 
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from the highly technical, and therefore, opaque character of their function, may 
become even more relevant 19. It remains to be seen whether those entities will keep 
their current independence or if the State will want to use them in the prosecution of 
immediate political objectives.  
A possible alternative, in a context where the Portuguese State maintains the access 
to capital markets and, consequently, to the necessary funds, may consist in the 
nationalization of companies considered “strategic”. 
 
2.2. Local power 
 
As regards cities, the trend highlighted in the international reports points to an 
increasing urbanization in developing countries and show human concentration in mega 
cities with over 10 million inhabitants. In Portugal, however, any progress concerning 
the urbanization rate will certainly be gradual and will not result from a remarkable 
increase of urban population. Rather, there will be a decrease in the rural population 
accompanying the slow decline of global Portuguese population estimated in all 
statistical studies 20. Still, the persistence of past trends will mean an accentuation of the 
“macrocephaly” of Portugal’s capital city, Lisbon. 
Just like in mega cities worldwide, it is in the Portuguese cities that lies the largest 
part of economic production. In Portugal, there is a relatively continuous coastal strip 
following a north-south axis, from Braga to Setubal, where the vast majority of the 
population lives and from which almost all of the national production wealth results. 
Special mention should be made to the existence of two main aggregating hubs – Porto 
and Lisbon – together with relevant medium-sized cities such as Braga, Aveiro, 
Coimbra and Leiria 21. 
One of the challenges faced by cities, including Portuguese ones, is to be capable of 
creating local economic development hubs, either through connections with 
international development hubs or, in the case of smaller cities, with national or 
neighboring countries’ development hubs. However, in the Portuguese case, the 
                                                          
19 Concerning regulatory authorities, cf. Maria Celeste CARDONA – Contributo para o conceito e a 
natureza das entidades administrativas independentes - As Autoridades Reguladoras. 
20 Cf. Instituto Nacional de Estatística - Projeções de população residente 2012-2060 and Fundação 
Francisco Manuel dos Santos – Projecções 2030 e o Futuro. 
21 Cf. Instituto Nacional de Estatística – Retrato Territorial de Portugal 2011, p. 21 and ff. It is also worth 
mentioning the existence of economic hubs outside the referred areas, which are still quite dependent 
from a single economic activity (tourism): Algarve and Madeira. 
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organization of political power has not permitted the elaboration of a regional 
development strategy. Small municipal entities face one of Europe’s most centralist 
States and are therefore incapable of assuming that role of strategic planning and 
execution 22. The contemporary Portuguese political system has only been able to 
guarantee the national capital’s economic development, whereas the remaining regions 
of the country continue to show GDP per capita levels much lower than the European 
average 23. 
Although there are constitutional constraints regarding the establishment of regional 
development strategies, and even though they cannot be considered as definitive 
indicators in that sense, political reforms adopted in the last decade may be seen as a 
reflection of the international trend of power diffusion. On the one hand, there is an 
increasing decentralization of State power through the transference of functions and 
competences to local authorities, in accordance with a logic of subsidiarity. On the other 
hand, there is a strengthening of municipal association, which tends to emerge as an 
intermediate administration level between the State and local authorities. 
If, by 2030, developments regarding the attribution of real political power to 
intermediate municipal entities have been registered, so that they comprise relevant 
urban agglomerations, then we could witness a rebalancing of economic development 
levels among the various Portuguese regions. Therefrom will also result political 
entities with sufficient power to contest the political options adopted at a State level, 
which will enhance the diffusion of power phenomenon. However, there will be no 
danger regarding national unity, since there are no linguistic, religious, historical or, in 
general, ethnic fractures that could raise that danger. 
 
2.3.  The networks 
 
According to the international reports referred above, non-state actors’ networks are 
destined to play an increasingly significant role. As regards the intra-state distribution of 
power, the creation and development of networks aiming at the defence of common 
interests – initially economic, then of different natures (including lobbies) – is an old 
                                                          
22 Thus, in 2014, Portuguese local authorities were responsible, on average, for expenses corresponding to 
only ca. 6% of the GDP, whereas in OECD countries, local authorities were responsible for expenses 
corresponding to 17% of the GDP – cf. OECD – OECD Regions at a Glance 2016, p. 96.  
23 So, in 2014, and considering level 100 as corresponding to the average EU purchasing power parity 
GDP per capita, the metropolitan area of Lisbon achieved level 106, while the Northern region of 
Portugal reached level 65 only – cf. EUROSTAT – 2014 GDP per capita in 276 EU regions, p. 7. 
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reality (v. g., unions and employers’ associations, and, from another point of view, 
political parties themselves) which is partly institutionalized (regarding Portugal, take 
the Economic and Social Council as an example). 
In Portugal, NGOs do not play the same role nor do they have the same relevance as 
in other states, namely when it comes to the promotion of public goods such as 
environmental protection. The reduced civic engagement which characterizes the 
Portuguese society, resulting from its individualistic culture, the population’s poor and 
late schooling and 50 years of authoritarian regime that limited freedom of speech and 
association, may partly explain that situation. There are some relevant NGOs, though 
(such as DECO, ACP), that play the role of spokespersons of interests that have greater 
difficulties associating in traditional lobbies. 
Still, if NGOs are considered in a wider sense 24, they comprise many (non-state) 
non-profit organizations and enjoy significant social and even political relevance. The 
influence of churches (especially the Catholic Church) is a classic, even if their strength 
has somewhat receded. The private social solidarity institutions (“IPSS”), often of 
Christian inspiration, mercies and mutualities, all play a quite relevant social role, of 
significant complementarity with the State, namely regarding social assistance to 
minors, elderly people and disadvantaged citizens, as well as in health and education. 
These institutions, which, according to their nature, may vary between 17.000 and 
70.000, are not efficiently federated. Still, it is worth mentioning a few, like the Union 
of Portuguese Mercies, the Union of Portuguese Mutualities and the National 
Confederation of Solidarity Institutions (“CNIS”) 25. The fact that they largely depend 
on public financing limits the counterpower they may represent facing the central State. 
Still, it is with «the closest public entities (decentralized State bodies and local 
municipalities) that NGOs have [and may develop] relations that are more frequent, 
with a better quality and larger possibilities of working in partnership» 26. 
As for the new social media, namely social networks, their emergence, as stressed at 
Serralves’ Conferences, has ambiguous effects. Quite often, demonstrations in the social 
networks express populist and immediate desires, largely connected with consumption, 
showing the inexistence of a “context of democratic debate”. These are unpredictable, 
                                                          
24
 Cf. Raquel Campos FRANCO (coord.) – Diagnóstico das ONG em Portugal, p. 65, for a wide concept of 
NGO. 
25 Cf. Raquel Campos FRANCO (coord.) – Diagnóstico das ONG em Portugal, p. 110 and 128. 
26




unexpected phenomena, since one citizen’s gesture may generate significant 
repercussions 27. Therefore, if NGOs develop the ability to channel these worries and 
aspirations shared on social networks, they may gain power and force the State to act by 
responding to the issues raised daily. 
 
3.  Conclusions – probable scenarios concerning the diffusion of powers in 
Portugal until 2030 
 
Between 1975 and 2015, Europe and the world lived under the ideological influence 
of the neoliberal revolution, expressed among other things in a wave of privatizations. 
Goods and services formerly provided by the State became the responsibility of private 
companies operating autonomously in accordance with market mechanisms. 
Additionally, the State started to count more and more on private entities (profit and 
non-profit) for the construction and management of public infrastructures and for the 
provision of social services. This evolution increased significantly the diffusion of state 
power. 
As to the decentralization of power to public entities, namely local municipalities, 
the last 40 years did not show significant developments in Portugal when compared to 
the boom occurred right after the April 1974 Revolution. The refusal to divide the 
country in administrative regions, refusal which resulted from the 1998 Referendum, is 
the most significant landmark of that (non) evolution. 
We believe we can point out three evolution scenarios for the country until 2030 as 
regards the diffusion of infra-state power. These scenarios result, mainly, from the 
possible evolution of consensus or majorities regarding the role of the State in society, 
the role of other regional or local public entities and the State’s financial availabilities. 
In all scenarios, as referred before, there is an increasing role of foreign-owned 
companies in Portugal. 
 
3.1. Scenario No. 1: Regionalized Liberal State 
 
In a first scenario, which we think is the most unlikely, the diffusion of powers will 
be maximized in accordance with a model we call Regionalized Liberal State. In this 
                                                          
27 Renato Janine RIBEIRO, Serralves Conferences, session of November 30, 2015, “O futuro da 
democracia e as exigências cidadãs?” (The future of democracy and citizens’ demands?). 
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scenario, the neoliberal ideology will continue to shape the evolution of diffusion of 
powers in Portugal, with a progressive privatization of public entities and services. 
The welfare state will be gradually dismantled. Social services (health, education) 
are free only for disadvantaged citizens and are provided by municipalities or even by 
private companies or NGOs. Simultaneously, administrative regionalization is 
implemented following a constitutional revision or a referendum. 
The path towards the completion of this scenario could involve the privatization of 
public hospitals and educational institutions owned by the State, as well as of public 
companies (such as Portugal’s biggest bank, Caixa Geral de Depósitos). The National 
Health Service would end and be replaced by a system analogous the Americans’ 
MEDICAID and MEDICARE. The Ministry of Education would stop managing public 
schools but would probably maintain its role as a regulator of the education market. As 
for Social Security, it would become private and would be substituted by a private 
insurance/pension funds system. 
The probability of this scenario becoming a reality seems, as referred above, quite 
small in the short/medium run. Even though it does not depend on the State’s financial 
availability (except as regards Social Security’s privatization), it counters the 
Portuguese population’s “ideological centre”, as well as most “published” opinion. As 
for regionalization, it faces significant constitutional and partisan hurdles. 
 
3.2. Scenario No. 2: Decentralized Social Liberal State  
 
In a second scenario, a controlled development regarding the diffusion of powers 
will take place until 2030, in accordance with a model we call a Decentralized Social 
Liberal State. 
In this scenario, liberal ideologies, on the one hand, and social democratic/social 
Christian ideologies, on the other hand, find a new balance, contributing for the 
evolution of the welfare state to a regulatory state, that guarantees the provision of 
public goods, through a progressive privatization and decentralization of both State 
entities and services. 
The State continues to guarantee the provision of social services, either free or low-
cost; yet, those services are provided by a variety of public (state, but also municipal or 
regional) and private (for-profit, NGOs) entities. There is a decentralization of powers 
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to municipalities and other public entities and the attribution of democratic legitimacy 
to supra-municipal territorial entities. Public entities may be privatized while keeping 
the rendering of public services off “pure” market mechanisms. Nevertheless, entities 
rendering those services must apply to the State for the adjudication of the service and 
are monitored by the State as regards the compliance with their obligations. The 
pensions system is unchanged and remains therefore in the public sphere. 
The path towards the completion of this scenario could, on the one hand, involve 
more public-private entities in areas where they seem to have worked (health, for 
example) and, generally, the use of non-state entities in the rendering of health care; the 
extension of association contracts to more schools; and the consolidation of the 
preschool education network through non-state institutions. On the other hand, it would 
involve direct election of metropolitan areas’ and inter-municipal communities’ 
governing bodies, followed by a negotiated assignment of powers. 
The probability of this scenario becoming a reality, as regards the provision of 
social services, seems quite low on the short run due to the current Portuguese political 
context. Still, chances increase from a medium-term perspective considering that a 
significant part of the national party system considers favourably the social-liberal 
mind-set that underlies this scenario. The scenario is partially conditioned on additional 
financial availabilities. Regarding political decentralization, the probability of occurring 
is medium in the short term. 
 
3.3. Scenario No. 3: Social Centralist State 
 
In a third scenario, a decrease in the diffusion of power will occur, in accordance 
with a model we call Social Centralist State. 
In this scenario, socialist/social-democratic ideologies stage a comeback against the 
neoliberal ideology of the last 40 years, imposing a return to the Welfare state of the 
second half of the 20th century by means of the nationalization and centralization of 
private or municipal entities and social services.  
The State reverses the recent movement of privatization and seeks to directly offer, 
through its institutions, all social services, including some traditionally offered by the 
private sector. Public entities lose their autonomy within the National Health Service 
and the National Education System. The pension system obviously continues to be 
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State-run. Decentralization of powers to municipalities and other supra-municipal 
entities is limited. 
The path towards the completion of this scenario could involve the nationalization 
of some banks (v. g., Novo Banco); the definitive transfer of classes from private 
schools with association contracts to public schools; the non-transfer of public 
hospitals’ operations to private ones; the reversion of PPPs in health; and the reversion 
of the transfer of public hospitals to Mercies. 
The probability of completion of this scenario is quite significant on the short run, 
since it corresponds largely to the current Government’s programme and/or to the one 
from the parties that constitute its support base. In the long run, the probability of 
completion is medium, since it does not generate consensus among Portuguese (civil 
and political) society and constitutes, in some way, a return to the past. Furthermore, it 
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